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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2453
___________
ELUI PEREIRA-POLANCO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A44 921 747)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 16, 2010
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, Jr. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 17, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Elui Pereira-Polanco, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, has been a lawful
permanent resident of the United States since 1994. In July 2001, he pleaded guilty in

New Jersey to the distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. See N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(3). The Government charged Pereira-Polanco with
removability under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)], as an alien who, after admission, was convicted of violating a law
relating to a controlled substance. Pereira-Polanco appeared before an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”), conceded that he was removable, and applied for relief under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 He alleged that he will be tortured by a
gang, Chicho Buloba, which has threatened his family and murdered his cousin. PereiraPolanco supported his account with a police report, death records, his brother’s
testimony, and affidavits from family members who apparently are in hiding. He also
testified that three gang members were arrested in connection with the murder of his
cousin, but that he was unaware whether they were prosecuted. A news article in the
record stated that some police officers, who were members of the Chicho Buloba gang,
were fired from their jobs.
The IJ denied relief, concluding that the gang members’ arrest demonstrated that
the government of the Dominican Republic “lack[s] . . . any desire to tolerate the gang’s
activities or their actions against the Polanco family.” The Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed without opinion on April 27, 2010. Pereira-Polanco filed a

1

The IJ noted Pereira-Polanco’s conviction rendered him ineligible for
cancellation of removal, waivers of removal, asylum, and withholding of removal under
§ 241(b)(3) of the INA. Pereira-Polanco does not challenge these determinations.
2

timely petition for review.2 The Government has filed a motion to dismiss.
Because Pereira-Polanco is a criminal alien, this Court has jurisdiction to review
only constitutional claims, “pure questions of law,” and “issues of application of law to
fact, where the facts are undisputed and not the subject of challenge.” Kamara v. Att’y
Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotations and citations omitted). The
Government argues that Pereira-Polanco “has raised no such claims . . . .” We disagree.
Pereira-Polanco presents the legal question whether the BIA erred in concluding that he
did not meet his burden to show his eligibility for CAT relief.3 See Toussaint v. Att’y
Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[t]he question here involves not disputed
facts but whether the facts, even when accepted as true, sufficiently demonstrate that it is
more likely than not that [Toussaint] will be subject to persecution or torture upon
removal to Haiti.”). Accordingly, we will deny the motion to dismiss.
To be eligible for withholding of removal under the CAT, “[t]he burden of proof is
on the applicant . . . to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see
also Kamara, 420 F.3d at 212-13. Torture is defined as the intentional infliction of severe
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Pereira-Polanco initiated these proceedings by filing an Entry of Appearance form on
May 21, 2010. The Clerk directed the parties to comment on whether that document
constituted a petition for review. Perereira-Polanco did not specifically respond, but he
did file a proper petition for review on May 24, 2010. The Government argues that the
Entry of Appearance form did not constitute a petition for review, but concedes that
Pereira-Polanco cured the defect with the petition that he filed on May 24, 2010.
3

Pereira-Polanco also faults the BIA for affirming the IJ’s decision without issuing its
own opinion. We have held, however, that the BIA’s affirmance without opinion
pursuant to the streamlining regulations does not constitute a violation of due process.
3

pain or suffering “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
“For purposes of CAT claims, acquiescence to torture requires only that government
officials remain willfully blind to torturous conduct and breach their legal responsibility
to prevent it.” Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir. 2007). In
considering an application for relief under the CAT, the IJ must consider “all evidence
relevant to the possibility of future torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). This Court
reviews whether an alien has demonstrated a likelihood of torture under the substantial
evidence standard. See Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2004).
Pereira-Polanco argues that the IJ erred in determining that he failed to
demonstrate that the government of the Dominican Republic is willfully blind to the
gang’s torturous activities. Pereira-Polanco cites the dismissal of police officers with
gang ties as evidence of the government’s involvement in torture. But the dismissals
themselves suggest that the government seeks to eliminate corruption. Furthermore, the
arrests that were made in connection with murder of Pereira-Polanco’s cousin further
undermine his torture claim. Cf. Rodriguez Morales v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 884, 891
(11th Cir. 2007) (denying CAT claim where Colombian police investigated alien’s
complaints against guerilla organization). While Pereira-Polanco’s family members have
gone into hiding because of the gang’s threats, there is no indication that the police have
refused to act after being asked to intervene. Pereira-Polanco further claims that the IJ
should have granted relief based on the State Department Country Reports “which
See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
4

describe police and military involvement in criminal activity.” Such a description,
however, does little to advance his claim that the government seeks to torture him
through its ties to the Chicho Buloba gang.
Pereira-Polanco also argues that the BIA should have remanded the case based on
his criminal attorney’s failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his state
court guilty plea. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483, (2010), the Supreme
Court held that “[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward . . ., a criminal
defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences . . . [b]ut when the
deportation consequence is truly clear, . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear.” Pereira-Polanco’s suggestion that he will be granted post-conviction relief based
on Padilla is speculative, however, and we have held that the pendency of post-conviction
motions do not negate the finality of criminal convictions for immigration purposes. See
Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3rd Cir. 2008).
For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.4
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The Government’s motion to dismiss is denied.
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